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FINGERPRINT SCIENCE
BY JOSEPH B. KADANE
Carnegie Mellon University
This paper examines the extent to which data support the source at-
tributions made by fingerprint examiners. It challenges the assumption that
each person’s fingerprints are unique, but finds that evidence of persistence
of an individual’s fingerprints is better founded. The use of the AFIS (Au-
tomatic Fingerprint Identification System) is problematic, because the algo-
rithms used are proprietary. Additionally, the databases used in conjunction
with AFIS are incomplete and not public. Finally, and most crucially, the find-
ing of similarities between the mark found at a crime scene and a fingerprint
on file does not permit estimation of the number of persons in a given popula-
tion who share those characteristics. Consequently, there is no scientific basis
for a source attribution; whether phrased as a “match,” as “individualization”
or otherwise.
1. Contributions of Steve Fienberg to the nexus between statistics and
forensic science. Soon after Steve Fienberg joined the Statistics Department at
Carnegie Mellon in 1980, Steve, Morrie Degroot and I recognized that we all had
served as expert witnesses. We saw the law as a fruitful area of statistical appli-
cation to explore. This led us to our jointly edited book, DeGroot, Fienberg and
Kadane (1983). It also led to the review paper of Fienberg and Straf (1982), an-
nouncing the establishment of an NRC panel on Statistical Assessments as Evi-
dence in the Courts. This panel was jointly sponsored by two committees of the
National Research Council: the Committee on National Statistics and the Com-
mittee on Research on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The
panel’s report [Fienberg (1989)] concentrated on civil cases, such as discrimination
by age, race or sex, and commercial disputes.
Later, attention shifted to the criminal law. Steve chaired the Committee to Re-
view the Scientific Evidence on the Polygraph (2003). A parallel Committee on
Scientific Assessmant of Bullet Lead Elemental Composition Comparison (2004)
was also conducted. These reports showed that the methods used in these two
forensic disciplines were not scientifically based, and led to (some) reforms. In
the same period, Steve also led the Sackler Conference on Forensic Science: The
nexus of science and law [Fienberg (2005)]. The NAS/NRC panel on forensic
science [Committee on Assessing the Needs of the Forensic Science Community
(2009)], led to increased attention to the parlous state of science more generally
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in the forensic sciences. In response, the Obama Administration appointed a Na-
tional Commission on Forensic Science, of which Fienberg was the sole member
who was a statistician. Fienberg was also very active in putting together the pro-
posal, with Alicia Carriquiry, Bill Eddy, Karen Kafadar and Hal Stern, that led
to the founding and funding of CSAFE (Center for Statistics and Applications in
Forensic Evidence). In that connection, Steve asked me to look into fingerprints.
The remainder of this paper is a summary of what I found.
2. Several cultures. The forensic sciences live at the crossroads of several
rather different cultures. First, they are aimed at helping the legal community by
advising on the import of various kinds of evidence. Historically they have been
funded by, and usually report to, the prosecution or police in criminal cases. (I’ll
come back later to this point to discuss the extent to which this history and current
practice may lead to bias in their work.)
The second culture that affects the forensic sciences is science itself. Science
tends to be cautious about making claims, and careful about conclusions. The
well-known 2009 National Academy of Sciences report, “Strengthening the Foren-
sic Sciences in the United States: A Path Forward” [National Research Council
(2009)], on the forensic sciences criticized many forensic disciplines for their lack
of careful experimental work to support their claims.
The third culture is the forensic community itself, which has its own journals,
professional societies and traditions. Forensic laboratories concentrate on case
work, and are often underfunded and overworked. They interact with the legal
and scientific communities in various ways, some comfortable, some not.
Among the forensic science disciplines, fingerprint analysis holds a special
place. Until the advent of DNA, it was regarded as the best founded forensic dis-
cipline. It is very widely used in criminal cases, and has been the subject of recent
scrutiny. This paper focuses on fingerprint analysis.
3. Early recent history of fingerprint analysis. While there were precedents
for interest in fingerprints dating back centuries, fingerprint analysis started to be
taken seriously as a way to identify people with the publication of two letters in
the English journal Nature in 1880. Henry Fauld (1880) wrote the first letter, pub-
lished on October 8. He had been a missionary in Japan, and had gotten inter-
ested in finger marks on pottery, and later studied fingerprints of various species
of monkeys. He moved on to people, and recounts two criminal cases in which
he found fingerprints useful. The publication of Fauld’s letter led to a response
from William Herschel (1880), who had been an administrator in British India. He
had been using fingerprints to certify the identity of signers of documents. (Later
these two would contest who deserves the greater credit for suggesting the use of
fingerprinting to identify people.)
Soon after this exchange, Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens) published a short
story, “A Thumb-print and What Came of It,” in 1883. It’s a wonderful tale, the
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crux of which is that a murderer was identified by a bloody thumbprint left at a
crime scene. This story was published as part of Twain’s “Life on the Mississippi.”
The first scientific investigation of fingerprints was undertaken by the statisti-
cian and geneticist Francis Galton (1888, 1892), first as a letter in Nature in 1888,
and then in his book, “Finger Prints,” published in 1892.
Twain’s “The Tragedy of Pudd’nhead Wilson” (1894) revolves around children
switched at birth, but unmasked later by fingerprints collected at birth. Conan
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes finds in “The Norwood Builder” (1903) that a finger-
print had been added to a crime scene, which enables him to detect a deception
aimed at convicting an innocent man.
The importance of these fictional uses of fingerprints is that they introduced the
technique and its possible consequences to the nonprofessional public, laying the
groundwork in popular culture for its use in court.
4. What fingerprint analysts do. What follows below is a very brief expo-
sition of the main steps taken in fingerprint analysis. The Fingerprint Sourcebook
[National Institute of Justice (2011)] gives a much fuller description.
A fingerprint analyst is presented with a mark found at a crime scene. The an-
alyst first determines whether the mark is of such quality that there is reasonable
hope of analysis. (Some aren’t, if they were smudged or degraded, for example.)
If the mark is regarded as having adequate quality, the mark is then put through an
AFIS system (Automated Fingerprint Identification System) against a database of
prints of known persons. AFIS identifies a handful of prints judged most similar
to the mark. The analyst then compares the mark to each such print on the basis of
structure and minutiae, and makes a “decision.” This work is then (supposed to be)
verified by an independent second examiner [National Institute of Justice (2011)].
When the verifier knows the outcome of the original analysis, as is often the case
in the U.S., the independence of the verification is impugned. If verification is
requested only for identification conclusions, the verifier already knows the ana-
lyst’s opinion. For a system in which independence is maintained, see Mustonen,
Hakkarainen and Tuuainen (2015).
Fingerprint analysts often point to the acronym ACE-V to explain what they do.
The letters stand for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification. However
what each of these activities actually comprise is not uniquely established, so two
different analysts can perform different activities, and arrive at different conclu-
sions, while both can claim to be using the ACE-V methodology. In this sense,
it is more an outline than a scientific method. Some commentary can be found in
Haber and Haber (2008) and Langenburg (2012).
5. Questions and issues.
a. Uniqueness
There are two senses of what might be meant by uniqueness. The first is an ideal
representation of the finger with no loss of information. However, latent prints
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collected at a crime scene are generally partial, and can be smudged or otherwise
degraded. The first sense is typically the sense used in discussions of uniqueness,
and is the sense intended here.
There are two basic approaches to the question of whether a person’s fingerprint
on a specified finger could be the same as another person’s fingerprint. The first
is whether there is a basis in biological theory to support such a claim. For exam-
ple, there is such theory to claim that DNA of fraternal twins are distinct, relying
mainly on Mendelian genetics and the enormous number of genes and nongenetic
loci in DNA. An important series of studies [Srihari, Srinivasan and Fang (2008),
Liu and Srihari (2009)] shows that identical twins have patterns of fingerprints
that are more similar to each other than fraternal twins, and both have patterns of
fingerprints more similar to each other than do unrelated persons. These results
support the conclusion that fingerprints are determined only partially by genetics.
However, the biology of the development of fingerprints in the fetus does not ad-
dress the question of whether such development guarantees uniqueness [Maceo
(2009)].
A second source of information about uniqueness is empirical. At present,
“no two people in the world have been found to have matching fingerprints”
[Langenburg (2011)]. To what extent does this empirical finding support the propo-
sition of uniqueness? According to the U.S. Census Bureau there are more than 7.5
billion people in the world [United States Census Bureau (2017)]. Therefore, there
are (7.5 × 109)2/2 = 2.8 × 1019 pairs of people, and since each of them has 10
fingers, there are 100 comparisons to make. Therefore, there are 2.8 × 1021 com-
parisons involved in the claim of uniqueness. This is an impressively large number.
For example, fingerprint analysis in its current form started with Galton (1892), say
roughly 130 years ago. Since that time the number of seconds that have elapsed is
(60)2(24)(365.25)(130) = 4.1 × 109. Therefore, it would require over 6.8 × 1011,
that is, 680 billion, unique comparisons every second since 1892 to verify the hy-
pothesis empirically. Furthermore, people are born and die every day. It is hard to
believe that any but a tiny fraction of the necessary comparisons have been made.
Consequently, the empirical claim that no two people with identical prints have
been found is distinctly unimpressive.
This view is not unanimously held. For example, the International Association
for Identification (2007) wrote “The IAI fully supports the principle that finger,
palm and footprints (friction ridge detail) are unique to each and every individ-
ual. This principle has been well established through the biological sciences of
anatomy, embryology and genetics [. . . ] As yet, no two fingerprints from different
individuals have ever been found to be the same.” This statement is peculiar in that
it cites no references from the sciences mentioned to support uniqueness. Further-




The research on persistence is more reassuring. By comparing the fingerprints
of 15,597 persons arrested in Michigan from five to 12 years apart, Yoon and Jain
(2015) find that fingerprints do recognizably persist.
Informal discussion suggests that people who do a lot of work with their hands
gradually wear down their fingerprints. Their fingerprints haven’t changed, but
they can be less distinct, making them harder to recover at a crime scene or to print
under controlled circumstances. Additionally injuries and perhaps certain drugs
can alter the appearance of fingerprints. Nonetheless, in the main, fingerprints do
seem to be remarkably stable over time.
c. Infallibility
For a long time, fingerprint analysis was touted as infallible. For example, in
1985, the FBI’s “The Science of Fingerprints: Classification and Uses,” declares
“Of all the methods of identification, fingerprinting alone has proved to be [. . . ]
infallible.” Nonetheless, there is now a long string of cases in which fingerprint
analyses have been proven to be mistaken. Cole (2005) lists 22 of them, the most
famous of which is the false accusation against Oregon attorney Brandon Mayfield.
He was wrongly accused of participating in the Madrid bombing on the basis of
a fingerprint identification certified by three of the FBI’s most senior fingerprint
analysts, and confirmed by an independent fingerprint analyst hired by the defense
[Department of Justice (2006)]. See also Zabell (2005). Another important case
is that of Shirley McKie, a Scottish police officer wrongly accused of perjury for
testifying that she had never set foot in a particular crime scene; the police believed
they had found her fingerprint in that house. The police were very reluctant to
confront the possibility that they had made an error [Specter (2002)].
Additionally, there is evidence that fingerprint experts differ in their assessments
of the same print, and even differ with themselves when presented with the same
prints at a later time [Dror et al. (2011)].
In view of this litany of erroneous identifications, it seems absurd to keep de-
fending fingerprint evidence as infallible. The claim of infallibility, however, fit
with a broader effort by the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover to promote the FBI in spe-
cific, and law enforcement in general, as smarter, more scientific and more capable
than the facts warrant [Cecil (2014)].
In 1979, the International Association for Identification, in resolution 1979-7
deemed “testimony of possible, probable, or likely friction ridge identification”
to be “conduct unbecoming.” In 1980, this resolution was clarified, in resolution
1980-5, to require “a statement that the print could be that of someone else.” In
turn, both resolutions were rescinded by resolution 2010-18, which stated that
“The practice (of friction ridge comparison) by trained and competent examiners
has been shown, through experience and study, to be reliable with rare occurrences
of error.”
However, actual practice does not necessarily follow any of these prescriptions.
As late as 2015 in a case in Florida, a fingerprint expert was testifying to 100%
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certainty of an identification against a juvenile. In this case, the only evidence was
a fingerprint (Florida v. S. Hayes). Langenburg (2012), page 65, proposes that the
origin of forensic sciences in support of prosecutions, and the adversarial system
of US courts, both encourage statements of exaggerated certainty with respect to
fingerprint conclusions.
d. AFIS (Automatic Fingerprint Identification System)
I start this discussion by making two bold assumptions. (After discussing the
implications of these assumptions, I address the extent to which the real world
differs from these assumptions, and what consequences ensue.)
Assumption A. The AFIS system is unerringly accurate in finding that mem-
ber of the database of fingerprints most similar to the mark found at the crime
scene, and returns real-valued similarities without ties.
This assumption leaves unexamined (for the moment) the question of what is
meant by “similar;” the intent of the assumption is to give the benefit of the ambi-
guity to the AFIS system.
Assumption B. The database of fingerprints used by the AFIS system is a
random sample of the relevant population’s fingerprints.
Suppose the database has fingerprints of n people, with similarities to the mark
x1 < x2 < · · · < xn, so xn is the most similar to the mark found at the scene of a
crime. Under these assumptions only the fingerprint most similar to the mark (with
similarity xn) is a possible match. Its probability of being correct is n/N , where
N is the size of the population. To put some numbers to this, compare a national
database of 116 million to a local database of 10 thousand. The population might
be taken to be either the US population (324 million) or the world population (7.5
billion). Table 1 records the results.
Thus, the only case with appreciable probability of finding the correct match is
the national database and the national population, and then it is only 35.8%.
TABLE 1
Probability that the person whose fingerprint has similarity xn is the culprit under Assumptions
A and B
Probability that
Description N n match is correct
World comparison national database 7.5 billion 116 million 0.015
World comparison local database 7.5 billion 10,000 1.3 × 10−6
US population national database 324 million 116 million 0.358
US population local database 324 million 10,000 3.09 × 10−5
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As promised, I now consider relaxing Assumption A made above. In fact, there
are several AFIS systems, and their results are not identical (therefore they can’t all
be perfect) [Moses (2011)]. Also, they are proprietary, so no one outside the com-
pany that owns it knows the algorithm being used. Additionally, they are applied
to a variety of different databases.
Imagine that an analyst chooses to examine the 10 most similar fingerprints in
a database. This opens the fingerprint analyst to the following hypothetical cross-
examination:
Q: Do I understand correctly that you examined the fingerprints of only 10 people
in the database you used?
A: Yes.
Q: Why did you not examine the fingerprints of the other people in the database?
A: Because the agency requests AFIS output of the 10 fingerprints most similar
to the mark found at the crime scene.
Q: Do you know what measure of similarity is used in the AFIS system you
employed?
A: I believe that AFIS similarities measure the physical distance and angle be-
tween the marked minutiae in both the searched and the candidate prints. Gen-
erally, greater similarities increase the score.
Q: Let me ask again. Do you know the formula used to calculate the similarity
measure used by the AFIS system you employed?
A: No.
Q: Then what expertise do you have to offer the court on whether other people
in the database might have fingerprints more similar to the mark found at the
crime scene than those of the defendant?
Now reconsider Assumption B, that the database consists of the fingerprints
of a random sample of people either in the world or in the US population. Of
course, it doesn’t. Fingerprints are taken of people generally because they have
been arrested, or because they hold particularly sensitive jobs. A worldwide ran-
dom sample could include, for example, a Mongolian cattle-herder, someone very
unlikely to have committed a crime in the U.S. Therefore, common sense suggests
that local or national databases are more likely to contain the fingerprints of a cul-
prit than a random world-wide database. The question of “how much more likely”
is outside of the expertise of a fingerprint analyst, as the following hypothetical
cross-examination shows:
Q: Please describe your training as a fingerprint examiner.
A: I was taught how to compare two fingerprints, taking care to identify minutiae
in both, and how to account for possible distortion depending on how the mark
may have been placed on the object where it was found.
Q: Do you agree that the question of whether the person who left this mark at
the crime scene is in the database is an issue of statistics, criminology and the
sociology of crime?
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A: Yes.
Q: Were you trained in the sociology of crime, criminology and statistics?
A: No.
Q: So you are not in a position to opine, on the basis of your expertise in finger-
print analysis, on the probability that the person who left this mark is in the
AFIS database utilized in this case?
A: No.
It should also be pointed out that data on the proportion of crimes committed
by persons who live close to the scene of the crime are likely to be biased. Police
tend to look locally, so disproportionately the unsolved crimes may be committed
by nonlocals.
e. Contexual bias
Fingerprint examiners are after all human, and hence subject to the cognitive
limitations we all have. As described by Dror et al. (2011),
“The human cognitive system is limited in its capacity to process information. The
information available far exceeds available brain power and cognitive resources, and
therefore we can only process a fraction of the information presented to us. This mis-
match between computational demands and available cognitive resources caused the
development of cognitive mechanisms that underpin intelligence. For example, we pri-
oritize what information to process according to our expectations [. . . ] Expectations are
derived from experience, motivation, context, and other top-down cognitive processes
that guide visual search, allocation of attention, filtering of information, and what (and
how) information is processed. These mechanisms are vital for cognitive processes to
be successful. Expertise is characterized by further development and enhancement of
such mechanisms [. . . ]
Therefore, there are good scientific data showing that the presence of any contextual
information may affect cognitive information processing. Various factors and specific
parameters define the context, whom it may affect, how, and to what extent.”
The particular contextual information at issue with respect to fingerprint analysis
is what information other than the prints themselves should be made available to
the analyst at the time of the examination. It seems obvious that some additional
information is warranted, such as the nature of the surface from which the mark at
the crime-scene was lifted. But should the analyst be made aware of the nature of
the crime in question, the other evidence against the suspect, etc.?
In one dramatic experiment, by Dror, Charlton and Peron (2006), five experi-
enced examiners were each presented with fingerprints that they had examined
before, and assessed as a positive identification. The examiners were told (falsely)
that these were prints from the (infamous) Brandon Mayfield case. The examiners
were asked to examine the prints, paying attention only to the prints. Three of the
five changed their decision to exclude the suspect they had previously positively
identified. A fourth changed from positive identification to undetermined. Thus the
contextual information had a strong effect. Later work of Dror and Charlton (2006)
and Dror and Rosenthal (2008) confirmed this effect with less drastic contextual
information.
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It might be argued that, in analogy to medical diagnosis, a fingerprint analyst
might come to more accurate conclusions the more information he or she knows
about the case. For medical diagnosis, this argument makes a lot of sense. How-
ever, the legal context requires a different way of thinking. A fingerprint expert
testifying in court is there to give an opinion about fingerprints, not about the case
as a whole. To move beyond fingerprints is to usurp the role of the factfinders, the
jury or the judge. Thus the analyst’s information should be narrowed only to what
is necessary to appreciate the fingerprints themselves, independent of the ramifi-
cations the fingerprint conclusions may have on the rest of the legal and factual
issues before the court.
f. Proficiency examinations
The National Academy Report [National Research Council (2009)] recom-
mended developing proficiency testing in all forensic disciplines, including finger-
print analysis. In order to see why this is difficult, consider the following simplified
scenario of testing.
Imagine teaching a mathematics class, and giving a test. One can give a “hard”
test, in which the weaker students will perhaps perform uniformly poorly, while the
stronger students will have the opportunity to differentiate themselves from each
other. Alternatively, one could give an “easy” test, which can result in the stronger
students results being very similar, but the weaker students can differentiate them-
selves from each other. In both cases, the instructor can learn which questions were
harder than others, and which students are stronger than others. I refer to results
of this kind as “comparative” results, as the comparison is to others (questions or
students) within the examination. However the class average is a function of both
the class and the test, and therefore not in itself particularly meaningful. I refer
to results of this kind as “absolute” results, as it invites comparisons outside the
examination. Hence we may expect to be able to compare certain groups of test-
takers to others, or certain groups of test items to others. But we should not expect
to be able to assess the overall performance of the class, nor the overall difficulty
of the examination.
Now suppose that an observer is invited to use the outcome from this math-
ematics exam to judge the probability that a specified person will correctly an-
swer a given mathematics question. The observer would have to consider how the
mathematical skill of the person compares to the skill of those of the exam-takers.
Indeed there are likely to be a variety of different skills at play in solving a mathe-
matics problem, as some math solvers think more geometrically, while others think
more algebraically, for example. The observer would also have to consider how the
difficulty of the mathematics question compares to those on the exam, and again
“difficulty” may have several important dimensions. Both of these issues would
require the observer to have considerable knowledge and skill in order to have a
reasoned judgment about the relevance of the exam results.
Testing fingerprint analysts has all these issues, and more. Responding to the
call of the National Academy report, in a landmark study, Ulery et al. (2011),
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tested 169 latent print examiners who each saw approximately 100 pairs of prints
from a pool of 744 pairs, of which 520 were true mates from the same finger,
and 224 were not. The paper reports that “There is substantial variability in the
attributes of latent prints, in the capacities of latent print examiners, in the types of
casework received by agencies, and the procedures used among agencies.” (ibid.,
page 7734). The examiners in this study were aware that they were being exam-
ined. In the mathematics scenario, students either get the answer right or they do
not. In this case, there are more answers available to the participants. The examin-
ers were first presented with the latent print, and were asked to classify it into one
of three categories: Value for identification, value for exclusion only or of no value.
If the examiner found the latent to be of value (for identification or for exclusion
only), the examiner was then presented with an exemplar. The decisions available
to the examiner at that point were: individualization, exclusion or inconclusive.
Thus the analysis is considerably more complicated than that of the hypothetical
mathematics exam described above.
They found six false individualizations (0.1% of those regarded as of value for
identification). Additionally they found 450 false exclusions (7.5% of those re-
garded as of value for such evaluation). These results are “absolute results,” with
the qualifications discussed above. Individuals varied widely in the number of
comparisons they actually made, ranging from 13% to 73% among all presen-
tations, 19% to 94% when pairs judged by the examiner to be of no value are
excluded and 22% to 100% when limited to pairs regarded as of value for identi-
fication (ibid., Table S7). While some of this variability might be explained as the
result of the fact that each examiner was presented with a random sample of pairs,
it still suggests radical variation in the willingness of participants in the study to
commit. (These are “relative results,” comparing test-takers to one another.) Other
relative results are that uncertified examiners are as accurate as certified examiners
[see also Pacheo, Cerchai and Stoiloff (2014)], and that length of experience is un-
correlated with accuracy [see also Thompson, Tangen and McCarthy (2014)]. (The
latter is not as strange as it may seem. Examiners rarely get feedback from ground
truth, and hence have no opportunity to improve.) Relative results in other stud-
ies notably show that training does improve performance [Langenburg, Champod
and Genessay (2012), Tangen, Thompson and McCarthy (2011) and Thompson,
Tangen and McCarthy (2013, 2014)].
One unfortunate aspect of proficiency testing as it is currently conducted is that
the outcome data is sparse—one knows only the conclusion of the analyst, and
nothing of the thinking behind it. This issue has been confronted before in other
contexts. For example, in an effort to improve the teaching of physics, Larkin et al.
(1980) used think-aloud protocols to understand the differences in approach be-
tween novice and expert physics problem-solvers. See also Ericsson and Simon
(1980, 1993). The closest work of this type I have found related to fingerprint
analysis is a paper by Mustonen, Hakkarainen and Tuuainen (2015) in which they
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report excerpts from the statements of fingerprint analysts who made different con-
clusions from the same fingerprint comparisons. There are also some annotated
comparisons in Neumann et al. (2013). These illuminate some of the different
ways experienced analysts go about their work.
g. DNA envy
Until the advent and acceptance of DNA evidence in court, fingerprints were
regarded as the most solid of the forensic sciences. In what way, one might ask,
are inferences from DNA better grounded than are inferences from fingerprints? In
the case of DNA, there is well-established genetic theory, beginning with Mendel,
to support the assumption of independence between alleles from different chro-
mosomes, or from alleles on distant parts of the same chromosomes at the indi-
vidual level. At the population level, it is possible that subpopulations might have
positively correlated allele frequencies. However, research has shown that genetic
mixing among populations have led to such small estimates of this correlation that
it can be neglected for practical purposes [see, for example, Roeder et al. (1998)].
As a result, it is scientifically legitimate to multiply the frequencies of characteris-
tics from different chromosomes. This leads to well-based numerical estimates of
how frequently another person would be found with the specified genetic charac-
teristics. It also leads to remarkably small numbers for those estimates when many
characteristics are measured.
In the case of fingerprints, the underlying science is absent. There is no par-
ticular reason to believe that the finding of a particular characteristic, such as the
ending of a ridge in a particular location, is uncorrelated with another character-
istic, such as the finding of a bifurcation at some other location. Thus it is not
legitimate to multiply the frequencies together. It is possible that a standard way
of classifying the Type 1 and 2 characteristics of fingerprints could be found. Ap-
plied to a very large database such as the US national database, frequencies of
different fingerprint characteristics and their correlations could be estimated. To
do this would require serious resources and access to databases not publicly avail-
able. Hence fingerprints, with our current scientific knowledge, cannot deliver the
kinds of conclusions that DNA can.
h. A digital future?
There is discomfort in some quarters with the thought that fingerprint analy-
sis is subjective. [See President’s Council of Advsors on Science and Technology
(2016).] Of course it is, and there’s nothing intrinsically wrong with that. A fin-
gerprint analyst, accepted in court as an expert, is permitted to give an opinion,
which is naturally subjective. However, there is no particular reason why anybody
else’s subjective opinion should be the same, or even be influenced by the ana-
lyst’s opinion. The key question is not subjectivity, but rather what evidence can
be adduced to support the subjective opinion offered. Thus an opinion is just the
opening summary of the real substance, which is the rationale offered for the opin-
ion. A consumer of the opinion, such as a juror or judge, may or may not find the
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rationale convincing, and hence may or may not accept the proffered opinion as
influential to their own.
One way of reducing the worry about subjectivity might be to substitute com-
puters in the place of analysts. If such a computer system identifies the minutiae
and other characteristics to be used without human intervention, that would make
the inferences more reliable, in the sense that presumably a user would get the
same answer from the same inputs each time. However the algorithm embedded
in such a computer system would have to deal with the issue of the lack of sup-
port for the assumption of independence. The danger in looking to computers for
a solution to the issue of subjectivity is that for most lay people, computer code
is difficult to understand. Therefore the assumptions underlying the computations
would be hidden, but still present. This would be a step away from full disclosure
of the basis for a conclusion about a fingerprint question. “The computer says so”
ought not to be regarded as a convincing argument.
i. Reporting
There are many varieties of conclusion that have been proposed and used over
the years, including:
(a) as an objective fact, the flesh that made this mark at the crime scene is the
same flesh that made this print, to the exclusion of all others,
(b) same statement, deleting the last six words,
(c) same as (b), but substitute “It is my opinion that . . . ” for “As an objective fact,
. . . ”,
(d) same as (c) adding “The likelihood the impression was made by another (dif-
ferent) source is so remote that it is considered a practical impossibility”
[Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis (2011)].
Cole (2014) reviews the history behind these various formulations, and the am-
biguities of language underlying them. In 2018, the Department of Justice stated
that its latent print examiners may find source identification the conclusion “that
the observed friction ridge skin features are in sufficient correspondence such that
the examiner would not expect to see the same arrangement repeated in an impres-
sion that came from a different source.” However “An examiner shall not assert
a 100% level of certainty” or “assert that latent print examination is infallible”
[Department of Justice (2018)].
Similarly, the Defense Forensic Science Center recently amended the way they
report fingerprint analysis results [Swofford (2015)]. The new language is “The la-
tent print on Exhibit ## and the record finger/palm prints bearing the name XXXX
have corresponding ridge detail. The likelihood of observing this amount of cor-
respondence when two impressions are made by different sources is considered
extremely low.” Once again, such a statement, although vague (“is considered ex-
tremely low” by whom?), invites the reader or listener to make the unwarranted
conclusion that (with high probability) only one person could have made both.
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However, this conclusion is unwarranted scientifically, for the reasons given be-
low.
Now I will suppose that the analyst is working under ideal conditions, which
include a case manager who makes available to the analyst only the information
vital to the comparison of fingerprints (such as the surface from which the mark
was lifted). The case manager does not make available any other information about
the crime, in order to shield the analyst from biasing information. [Perhaps con-
textual information could be released sequentially [Dror et al. (2015)].]
I also suppose that the analyst examines first the mark at the crime scene, and
records each of the minutiae and other information the analyst intends to compare
to the prints. Suppose there is a single print at issue. If there are discrepancies, the
analyst must decide whether to declare “exclusion.” At one time, a single discrep-
ancy would have been sufficient to occasion such a declaration, but further thought
has softened that stance [for discussion, see The Detail (2006)].
Suppose that no discrepancies have been found, and certain coincidences have
been found between the mark and the print. The issue is what to make of this. Cer-
tainly, less frequent coincidences carry more information, intuitively, than more
frequent ones. But unlike the analysis of DNA, the assumption of independence
between coincidences is not warranted for fingerprints. Consequently, it would be
necessary to know the probability of the joint occurrence of the specific coinci-
dences found. Such data do not exist. At this point the current resources of science
are exhausted.
Recent work [Kadane and Koehler (2018)] shows that lay people respond to
summaries of the data worded as (a) “identifying the source,” (b) “identifying the
source to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” (c) “effect an individualiza-
tion” and (d) “effect an individualization to the exclusion of all other possible
sources in the world” in the same way as stating that this is the person who left
the mark. The proposed Defense Department language “the likelihood of observ-
ing. . . is considered extremely low,” was somewhat less incriminating. The lan-
guage “cannot exclude” was least incriminating, and only this language comports
with what is scientifically defensible.
6. Conclusion. A fingerprint analyst’s finding of minutiae and other indica-
tors common to a mark and a specified source reduces the group of possible cre-
ators of the mark. However, the available science does not permit one to say how
large the resulting group is. Furthermore, there are no scientifically established cri-
teria for when that set is reduced to a single person. Under these circumstances,
I believe that fingerprint reports and testimony should be limited to exclusion (the
person whose print is under discussion is very unlikely to have left the mark), in-
clusion (the person under discussion is one of the people who could have left the
mark) and undetermined.
When the comparison of a mark and a print reveal similarities and no differences
in minutiae and Level 1 characteristics, I recommend that the analyst report and
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testify that the defendant is one of the people who could have left the mark at the
crime scene. Another way to express this is that the defendant is not excluded. In
addition to being scientifically defensible, such testimony obviates discussion of
whether fingerprints are unique.
A referee argues for an analogy between fingerprint analysis and eyewitness
testimony. When eyewitness testimony concerns identifying someone the testifier
knows well, it is certainly due deference. However, eyewitness testimony concern-
ing strangers has met a barrage of criticism [see, for example, Arkowitz and Lille-
field (2010)]. There are all sorts of tricks the mind can play on someone trying to
reconstruct a memory. Indeed, although I think fingerprint analysts exaggerate the
import of their findings, my hunch is that stranger eyewitness testimony is even
less reliable.
I do not intend to give the impression that I think fingerprint analysis is worth-
less. It is clearly useful in eliminating possible suspects. It can also be useful as
an investigatory tool to suggest that the perpetrators of several crimes may be the
same person. It is also, I believe, relevant at trial as a piece of circumstantial evi-
dence. The current testimonial practices, even those so recently suggested by the
Department of Justice, exaggerate the import of fingerprint evidence in a way that
will bring it to disrepute.
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